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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
limitations suggested by the Department in both its regulation and
its arguments. It has established a policy of flexibility (possessing the
earmarks of durability-all nine judges concurred in the opinion),
which will permit the true sufferer to receive remuneration, but still it
specifically refrained from opening the door to undeserving claimants:
This decision is not to be construed as standing for the proposition
that all persons who are laid off, and who are relatively unsuccessful
in their self-employment endeavors, are considered to be unemployed,
or partially unemployed, and entitled to receive the difference between
the amount they make and the benefits to which they otherwise would
have been entitled.' 7
This decision might be criticized for "opening the floodgates of liti-
gation" as each farmer-laborer seeks to discover whether his particular
circumstances will find favor with the supreme court, but this is why
we have courts. Surely this decision will produce more litigation, but
as each case is decided the boundaries will become more certain and
fixed, and in the end we will have a rule that is the product of reason
and policy, and not one that is closely circumscribed by the short-
comings of semantic definitions.
HAYES ELDER
WILLS
Testamentary Capacity-Insane Delusions. In re Meagher's
Estate' apparently establishes a new rule requiring that the contestant
of a will on the ground of insane delusions must show that the delusion,
to produce goods, to make them and to sell at profit sufficient to attract to that in-
dustry the capital of the country. Without purchasers with money in their pockets,
the wheel of that industry cannot keep going. . . . We must anticipate in the future
the building up . . . of a large and steady purchasing power for a large number of
people." Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935). William Green, then president of the CIO, testified to the same
effect. Evaluating the Federal Social Security Act in a speech (An appraisal of the
Federal Social Security Act, Delivered before the Institute of Public Affairs, Uni-
versity of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, evening of July 10, 1936) Winthrop W.
Aldrich, Board Chairman of the Chase National Bank of the City of New York,
commented as follows: "The gains through unemployment insurance are numerous.
Its first effect is to diminish in the mind of the worker the fear of insecurity. He
knows that if he should lose his job he would not immediately face a total loss of
income. There will be at least some income during a few weeks or months while he
is looking for new work. This relief . . . will be an amount that he can count on.
There will be no humiliation in accepting it. . . . It will be an earned right. ...
"There is something to be said, also, for the effect of unemployment insurance on
business. It helps to stabilize the buying power of the workers. . . . [it] helps . . . to
keep buying in its accustomed channels."
17 160 Wash. Dec. at 719, 375 P.2d at 161 (1962).
1 160 Wash. Dec. 691, 375 P.2d 148 (1962).
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exclusive of any rational motive, was the controlling cause in the dis-
position of the property.'
Mrs. Meagher, the testatrix, took her sister's son, the contestant,
into her home and raised him as her own son after the contestant's
mother was committed to Western State Hospital in 1935. In 1940
Mrs. Meagher executed a will by which she gave all her property to
the contestant.
In 1955, when she was seventy-nine years of age, Mrs. Meagher sus-
tained a hip injury which resulted in hospitalization. Shortly afterward
the contestant filed a petition for the appointment of his law partner as
guardian of Mrs. Meagher's estate, and the appointment was there-
after secured. This guardianship was procured without first consulting
Mrs. Meagher. In the summer of 1956, after Mrs. Meagher's return
home, she was examined by her family physician at the request of her
guardian. Even though the results indicated no further need of a
guardian, the guardianship was not terminated until December 13,
1956, and then only upon the insistence of an attorney whom Mrs.
Meagher had employed after her return from the hospital.
At the time Mrs. Meagher consulted her attorney about the guardian-
ship, she expressed displeasure with her nephew because he would not
terminate it and because he had caused bonds to be sold to pay her
expenses when other money was available. Mrs. Meagher had de-
posited funds in a voluntary revocable trust account of which the
contestant was the beneficiary and in which there were sufficient funds
to pay her bills. The contestant explained that he had no recollection
of the existence of the passbook during the guardianship and had not
discovered it in the office safe until 1960.
In 1957 Mrs. Meagher consulted her attorney about executing a will.
Upon his advice Mrs. Meagher submitted to an examination.by her
family physician. The results showed that Mrs. Meagher had sufficient
capacity to execute a will. The examinining physician also informed
the contestant of the results, and was advised by the contestant that a
further examination should be held to determine whether Mrs. Meagher
suffered from any insane delusions toward him. The will in question
was executed on October 1, 1957, and a week later Mrs. Meagher was
re-examined by her family physician, who concluded that she was
suffering from insane delusions that her nephew was persecuting her.
This opinion was substantiated at the trial by the testimony of a
2 Id. at 700, 375 P2d at 153.
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psychiatrist in answer to hypothetical questions.
This later will provided a bequest for contestant's mother, for whom
the 1940 will had made no provision, and bequests of equal amounts
to all her nieces and nephews, including the contestant. The trial court
held the will invalid, basing its decision on the medical testimony.
In reversing the trial court and upholding the validity of the will, the
supreme court starts with the presumption that the testatrix had testa-
mentary capacity upon the showing that her will was properly executed
and rational on its face.? The court then says that
even if there was evidence of an insane delusion of such a nature as to
affect the will, there was substantial evidence of other rational motives
for the disposition made. The respondent [nephew] has failed to
overcome the presumption of validity and to show that the delusion,
exclusive of the rational motive, was the controlling cause in the
disposition of the property .... 4
Prior to the onset of the alleged insane delusions, Mrs. Meagher's
affection for the contestant was the same that she would have had for
her own son. The 1940 will showed that she desired to leave to him the
bulk of her property. Although this fact would support the contestant's
proposition that the provisions of the 1957 will resulted from delusions,
the court also looks to facts which demonstrate logical and rational
motives for the change in the disposition of her property: The testatrix
was very close to her sister who had been committed to the mental
hospital. She had observed the equity with which her brother's will
had provided for their confined sister, while her own 1940 will had
made no such provision. She had also observed that her brother had
dealt equally with his nephews and nieces, even though some had been
closer to him than others. The contestant was financially independent
and the testatrix had already done much for him to the exclusion of her
other nephews and nieces. The will itself expressed no bitterness
toward the contestant, and the bequest to him was equal to that re-
ceived by others in the same blood relationship to the testatrix. The
court concludes that the totality of these facts "overwhelmingly" dem-
onstrates the will to have been the product of a rational mind and of
logical motives, and not the product of any insane delusions which may
have affected the testatrix.'
3 Id. at 692, 375 P.2d at 149.
4 Id. at 700, 375 P.2d at 153.




The execution of a will should be a free and voluntary act of the
testator, necessarily implying some degree of mental competency.'
Since the right to dispose of property by will is protected by statute,' it
is first necessary to discover the statutory requirements pertaining to
capacity. But the statute only requires the testator to be of "sound
mind,"78 so the court must provide the standard for determining whether
a particular testator executed his will as a free and voluntary act.
In defining this standard the courts start with the presumption that
a testator has capacity if the will is rational on its face and is shown
to have been executed according to law.9 To overcome this presumption
the contestant must introduce evidence to show that at the time the will
was executed the testator did not have sufficient mind and memory to
recollect the natural objects of his bounty, to comprehend generally the
nature and extent of his property, or to understand the transaction in
which he was then engaged.10 This evidence must be clear, cogent, and
convincing." But even though a testator has general testamentary
capacity,12 the instrument will still fail if the testator makes his disposi-
tion as a result of an insane delusion."
6 ATKINSON, WILLS 233 (2d ed. 1953).
7
n re Drown's Estate, 160 Wash. Dec. 110, 372 P.2d 196 (1962) ; In re Gordon's
Estate, 52 Wn.2d 470, 326 P2d 340 (1958) ; In re Martinson's Estate, 29 Wn.2d 912,
190 P.2d 96 (1948) ; In re Hamilton's Estate, 26 Wn2d 363, 174 P.2d 301 (1946).
8 RCW 11.12.010: "The following persons of sound inind may, by last will, devise
all his or her estate, both real and personal ... " (Emphasis added.)
9 In re Mitchell's Estate, 41 Wn.2d 326, 249 P.2d 385 (1952) ; In re Gwinn's Estate,
36 Wn.2d 583, 219 P2d 591 (1950) ; it re Kessler's Estate, 35 Wn.2d 156, 211 P.2d
496 (1949).
'Oln re Youngkin's Estate, 48 Wn.2d 432, 294 P.2d 426 (1956); In re Peter's
Estate, 43 Wn.2d 846, 264 P.2d 1109 (1953) ; In re Mitchell's Estate, 41 Wn.2d 326,
249 P.2d 385 (1952).
11 "I re Drown's Estate, 160 Wash. Dec. 110, 372 P.2d 196 (1962) ; In re Gordon's
Estate, 52 Wn.2d 470, 326 P.2d 340 (1958) ; In re Youngkin's Estate, 48 Wn2d 432,
294 P.2d 426 (1956).
12 At this juncture it must be mentioned that there is a divergence of opinion be-
tween medical and legal authorities as to what constitutes insanity. In Green, Public
Policies Underlying The Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MIcla. L. REV. 1189,
1191 (1940), the author says: "The difficulty lies in the fact that insanity has a
lay meaning, a medical meaning, and a legal meaning, no two of which coincide.
The lay meaning is vague and may connote anything from eccentric conduct to raving
madness. Medical men are not agreed upon a definition of insanity for medical pur-
poses, and courts are not agreed upon a definition of insanity for legal purposes.
Doctors have disowned the word and coined their own term of mental disorder. Courts
are aware of the fact that insanity is not a term which has legal significance, that
only particular kinds or degrees of insanity require changes in legal relations....
Hence the term mental incompetency, by which we mean that type of degree of mental
disorder, in any particular case, which is legally significant and which produces a
different legal result than would have flowed from the same situation had not that
particular type or degree of mental disorder been present."
13 Winn v. Dolezal, 355 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1960) ; In re Duross' Estate, 395 Pa. 492,




An insane delusion is not merely a false belief."5 We all hold false
beliefs of one sort or another at some time during our lives. But these
false beliefs, even though they motivate our actions, are not so fixed
that we cannot be persuaded to abandon them." These false beliefs
may consist in bias or dislike toward a relative; but even though un-
explained and irrational, they will not by themselves amount to an
insane delusion." Filthy habits, unsociability, and miserliness will not
by themselves invalidate a will.1 Peculiar religious beliefs, like a belief
in Spiritualism, will not alone be sufficient."
An insane delusion, therefore, is more than just a mere delusion, a
false belief, an eccentricity, a clash between two persons of different
temperament or personality, or a religious or racial prejudice of
ancestral origin. It is a delusion that is the product of a sick or diseased
mind and that is held to without evidence or rational basis .... 20
To what will the courts look to determine whether a delusion is an
insane one? In Washington, the standard was set forth in In re Klein's
Estate.2 There the court said that "an insane delusion denotes a false
belief, which would be incredible in the same circumstance to the
victim thereof were he of sound mind, and from which he cannot be
dissuaded by any evidence or argument .... 112' But upon establishing
that there is an insane delusion under this standard, will it mean an
automatic invalidation of the will?
In answering this inquiry the court in the Klein case quotes with
In re Klein's Estate, 28 Wn.2d 456, 183 P.2d 518 (1947) ; In re Wicker's Will, 15
Wis.2d 86, 112 N.W.2d 137 (1961).
'4 It must again be mentioned that this discussion is only relevant as to the legal
definitions of insane delusions. "Even though a testator may have intellectual capacities
far above the standard set by the law . . .his testamentary dispositions still will be
held void if he entertains an insane delusion on but one subject where that delusion
motivated the disposition made of his property. . . .Psychiatrists will tell us that if
a man entertains but one insane delusion referable only to one particular subject he is
not of sound mind. This may be true in a medical sense, but it certainly is not true
of the legal definition of a sound mind. ... Green, Public Policies Underlying The
Law Of Mental Incompetency, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1189, 1218 (1940).
151 PAGE, WILLS § 12.29 (rev. ed. 1960).
16 Ibid.
17 In re Alegria's Estate, 87 Cal. App. 2d 645, 197 P.2d 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948)
In re Sommerville's Estate, 406 Pa. 207, 177 A.2d 496 (1962) ; In re Duross' Estate,
395 Pa. 492, 150 A.2d 710 (1959) ; In re Gwinn's Estate, 36 Wn.2d 583, 219 P.2d 591
(1950).
1s In re Miller's Estate, 10 Wn.2d 258, 116 P.2d 526 (1941).
19 In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Wash. 113, 151 Pac. 264 (1915).
20 1 PAGE, WILLS § 12.29 (Rev. Treat. 1960).
2128 Wn.2d 456, 183 P.2d 518 (1947).
22 Id. at 472, 183 P.2d at 526.
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approval from another leading case, In re Shanks Willk
It is not a question whether testator had general testamentary capacity,
for many persons laboring under insane delusions may be competent to
make a will (In re Will of Cole, 49 Wis. 179, 5 N.W. 346), but
whether the insane delusion under which the testator suffered materi-
ally affected the will he made. In other words, is it reasonably certain
that but for the insane delusion his wife would have received a
materially larger devise?...21
The court in the Klein case then proceeds to establish the criterion
whereby an insane delusion will invalidate a will:
An insane delusion having been found to exist, it becomes necessary to
determine whether such delusion materially affected the will or some
provision thereof. It is not every insane delusion that will render a will
invalid, but only such as enters into the product of the testamentary
instrument.... (Emphasis added.)2 5
The standard in Washington26 conforms with that of other jurisdictions
which invalidate a will by reason of an insane delusion only if it is a
product of that delusion."
However, the court in the Meagher decision does not rely on the
Klein test, although they cite the case with approval.2 8 Instead they
rely on a rule from an annotation in the American Law Reports :21
[E]ven if there is evidence of an insane delusion of such a nature as to
affect the will, if there is also evidence of some other and rational
motive for the disposition made, the burden is upon the contestant to
rebut or overcome the legal presumption of validity, by showing that
the delusion, exclusive of rational motive, was the controlling
cause .... so
In the cases cited by the annotator the courts uphold the wills because
the contestant's behavior toward the deceased furnish valid reasons for
disinheritance by any person. The courts then go on to hold that the
contestant in each case has not shown that the insane delusion was the
23172 Wis. 621, 179 N.W. 747 (1920).
24Id. at 748; In re Klein's Estate,, 28 Wn.2d 456, 471, 183 P.2d 518, 526 (1947).
25 28 Wn2d at 472, 183 P.2d at 526.2
0 
81 re Gwinn's Estate, 36 Wn.2d 583, 219 P2d 591 (1950) ; In re O'Neil's Estate,
35 Wn.2d 325, 212 P.2d 823 (1949).27Eason v. Eason, 203 Va. 246, 123 S.E.2d 361 (1962) ; Winn v. Dolezal, 355 P.2d
859 (Okla. 1960), citing In re Klein's Estate, 28 Wn.2d 456, 183 P.2d 518 (1947);
In re Wicker's Will, 15 Wis.2d 86, 112 N.W2d 137 (1961).
28 160 Wash. Dec. at 692, 375 P.2d at 149.
20Id. at 693, 375 P2d at 150; Annot., Testaimentary Capacity-Insane Delusions
175 A.L.R. 882, 964 (1948).
30 160 Wash. Dec. at 693, 375 P2d at 150.
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controlling factor, i.e., that it took predominance over the valid reasons
for disinheritance.31 However, the court in Meagher applies the rule
to a situation where the contestant has not behaved toward the testa-
trix so as to furnish any valid reasons for disinheritance.
Opposed to Meagher is a recent New York decision which rejects
the rule that rational reasons for the disposition made may support the
validity of the will even though there are insane delusions which affect
the will. In In re Honigman's Will,3 2 the proponents argued that even
if the testator was suffering from an insane delusion of his wife's
infidelity, the will was nevertheless valid because of the size of the
contestant's independent fortune and the financial need of the testator's
residuary legatees. The court rejected this argument, quoting from an
earlier New York case,33 where they had said "that a will was bad when
its 'dispository provisions were or might have been caused or affected
by the delusion'.... ." (Emphasis added.) 4
On the other hand, in a recent Pennsylvania case,3" the court inquired
into the rational reasons and motives behind the testator's disposition, 6
even though they accepted the evidence of an insane delusion. From
31 Annot., supra note 29, at 964-66 (1948). The following cases are some of those
cited by the annotator: In Coit v. Patchen, 77 N.Y. 533 (1879), the husband attacked
his wife's will on the ground that she was suffering from insane delusions as to his
relations with other women. The court sustained the validity of the will since there
was also evidence of violent quarrels, frequent separations, and at one time a divorce
suit, and the husband could not show that she acted on the delusions instead of these
other reasons for discriminating against him. In Lareau v. Lareau, 208 S.W. 241
(Mo. 1918), there was evidence that the testatrix had an insane delusion that her
brother intended to kill her; but there was also evidence that her brother had mis-
treated her for years. In III re Nicholas, 216 App. Div. 399, 215 N.Y.S. 292 (1926),
aff'd without opinion in 244 N.Y. 531, 155 N.E. 885 (1926), the testator's son con-
tended that the testator had acted under an insane delusion that the son intended
to kill him. There was evidence of long quarrels and litigation between them, and
the court held that even if the insane delusion did exist it would not invalidate the
will if the testator had other reasons for disinheriting his son. The case cited in the
annotation most similar to the present case is that of Potter v. Jones, 20 Ore. 239,
25 Pac. 769 (1891), where the testator's contesting daughter had remained with her
mother after the testator and his wife were divorced. This period of separation ex-
tended over twenty years. The evidence showed that the testator harbored an insane
delusion that his daughter was illegitimate. The court upheld the validity of the will
on the basis of evidence which showed that the cause for disinheriting the daughter
was that she was in good circumstances, and that the children who remained with
him had assisted in the accumulation of the estate.
32 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676 (1960).
33 American Seaman's Friend Soc'y v. Hopper, 33 N.Y. 619, 625 (1865).
3 4 In re Honigman's Will, 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676, 679 (1960).
35 1n re Duross' Estate, 395 Pa. 492, 150 A.2d 710 (1959).
36 Id. at 717: "Margaret Duross did not leave her estate-hating and being hated
by everybody-to a Home for homeless cats, or even to a Church or Charity; she
left it to her best friend, who was unmarried and whom she wanted to financially aid
and protect. Moreover, she appointed one of her brothers executor of her will; and,
as above mentioned, she left part of her property, viz., her retirement fund of $3,543,
to her sister . . . and a $10,000 insurance policy to her nephews and nieces, four of
whom were children of the contestant .. "
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the face of the will and the disposition of the testator's property, the
court concluded that the will was valid: "[W]here insane delusions do
exist, but the will itself shows that they did not control the will or were
not the cause which motivated and influenced the decedent's disposition
of his estate, the delusions have no relevancy and cannot invalidate the
will...." (Emphasis added.)37 The Meagher decision would derive
support from that result, for the Washington Supreme Court says
therein: "It is evident that, whatever delusions she may have had, she
put them aside when she designed her will.... The evidence is over-
whelming that the will was the product of logical and rational motives
and not of any insane delusion which the testatrix may have suf-
fered...." (Emphasis added.)38
But is it necessary for the court to adopt a new standard? Cannot
the same decision be reached under the existing rule of the Klein case?
The court in that case said that the insane delusion must be a material
cause of changes made in the will. The contestant in the Meagher
case was not disinherited but received an equal bequest with all others
in the same blood relationship with Mrs. Meagher. Her previous will
had contained no provision for her beloved and helpless sister. The
contestant had attained financial independence, and the will itself
contained no expression of bitterness or illwill toward the contestant.
In light of these facts, is it not reasonable to conclude that the insane
delusion was not a material cause of the change made in the will?4"
Since Mrs. Meagher's will apparently withstands attack under the
Klein rule, one may wonder why the court has undertaken to impose a
heavier burden on contestants by requiring them to prove that an
insane delusion is not only a material, but also a controlling, cause of
the testator's disposition.
In dictum the Meagher opinion announces two rules which no Wash-
ington decision has apparently mentioned before. The first is that if
there is any actual basis for the belief held by the testator, even though
it is not well founded and is disbelieved by others, the belief will not
37 Id. at 717.38 160 Wash. Dec. at 701, 375 P.2d at 154.
39 28 Wn2d at 472, 183 P.2d at 526.40 The court in the Klein case says that a will is only invalid when the insane de-
lusion enters into the "product of the testamentary instrument." Consequently it
might be argued that the insane delusion need only touch upon the will to invalidate it.
It is logical to assume, however, that this statement would be limited by the pre-
ceding sentence requiring the insane delusion to "materially affect the will." There-
fore, the insane delusion must materially enter "into the product of the testamentary
instrument." See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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be such a delusion as will invalidate the will.41 The second is "that a
will is not invalidated by a delusion of the testator with respect to a
relative who is provided for with reasonable liberality by the will.... ,4 _-
It is questionable whether the Washington court would follow either of
these rules in the future. Since the definition of an insane delusion has
been established by the Klein case, the former rule would appear to be
unnecessary. The latter rule has no recent support and is too rigid for
practical application.
As a result of the Meagher decision, it appears there are now two
rules in Washington with respect to insane delusions. The Klein test,
which concentrates on the effect of the insane delusion on the will, and
the Meagher test, which concentrates on the circumstances surrounding
its distributive provisions.43 Consequently a contestant has a greater
burden of proof than before, for now he must not only prove that the
alleged insane delusion affected the will, but also that it was the
controlling factor.
JOHN S. CALVERT
41 160 Wash. Dec. at 693, 375 P.2d at 150. This rule has support from In re
Alegria's Estate, 87 Cal. App. 2d 645, 197 P.2d 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948) ; and has
been rejected in ip re Wicker's Will, 15 Wis.2d 86, 112 N.W.2d 137 (1961).
42 160 Wash. Dec. at 694, 375 P.2d at 150.
43 In the alternative it may be suggested that the Meagher decision does not create
a new rule but rather provides a stricter interpretation of the Klein case.
(VOL. 38
